Claude Code sends your email address to websites
github.com1584 points by motoroco 2 days ago
1584 points by motoroco 2 days ago
Many people report seeing this behavior when using the SEC API specifically which makes me think that service is requesting this. Maybe email is required by the SEC API?
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UPDATE: The SEC API documentation requires your email in the User-Agent and will reject you otherwise. Demo:
U='https://data.sec.gov/api/xbrl/companyconcept/CIK0000320193/us-gaap/Assets.json'
curl -s -o /dev/null -w 'response: %{http_code} curl default User-Agent, rejected\n' "$U"
curl -s -o /dev/null -w 'response: %{http_code} email in user-agent, success\n' -A 'Acme Research admin@acme-research.example' "$U"
response: 403 curl default, rejected
response: 200 email in user-agent, success
SEC docs: https://www.sec.gov/search-filings/edgar-search-assistance/a...So basically Claude is trying to problem solve, and just does what the SEC asks. It's a 'prompt injection attack', but the entity instructing this behavior is the SEC. Tricky alignment problem. Pretty silly mechanism, since of course there's no email validation. (edit: turns out the SEC will accept most any non-cURL user-agent, email not actually required)
I work with the SEC data, and have a work contact e-mail explicitly for this. I similarly caught Claude happily sending my personal e-mail (likely just the e-mail associated with the Claude account), without prompt or warning, only because I happened to catch it in the curl requests. Definitely a security concern that Claude generally has this behavior, even if in this specific instance it was more of a mild annoyance.
Better sandboxing is possible and would help this.
Agreed. I was just a bit surprised that the account information/PII seemed to not have explicit gating, given so much work has gone into gating commands and curl requests.
It seems outside of user expectations for Claude Code, at least; I could see it arguably being what some users expect for the Claude app, if some people are using it to fill out forms or something (ill advised as that seems to me).
Please don't mix personal and work. Using a personal LLM account on work computer etc. It leads to many problems.
A startup forum is a strange place to assume someone works at a corporation with work computers and AI account budgets.
Realistically, there are concepts like threat models to help decide whether or not a TODO list app needs a SCIF, or a few curl requests need their own sandboxed Claude Max account.
Even if you have to use personal laptops for work, why wouldn't you create separate users for work and personal lives?
It's insane to me that programmers out of all people seem utterly incapable of accepting the most minor of inconvenience for the most modest modicum of privacy and security. There are other people in this post complaining that Claude should have asked the user before sending network requests. Well guess what, it does if you don't fucking run `--dangerously-skip-permissions`, but you do because how else you are gonna slop your way to rewrite every swath of existing insecure software to fix the bullshits this industry impounded upon itself unconscientiously for the past 30 years by allowing a non-deterministic babeller RCE its way onto your fucking personal-work machine.
> why wouldn't you create separate users for work and personal lives?
Because it's a pain in the ass and only advantageous in very specific work life scenarios that a lot of people don't fall under.
Why would you assume one size fits all, so to speak?
I've tried the multi-user approach, and it is annoying when you install something in $HOME/bin rather than /usr/local/bin so that you have to go back and re-install globally or install again to local. You really have to remind yourself that it isn't just a different project. As with most things in life, practice/repetition makes it easier. You just need to decide if it is worth it
Some corporations do not provide claude access so you use your own account.
In the real engineering world, it's seen as unethical (for both practitioners and firms) to have practitioners using their privately owned tools for the firm's work.
There's nothing about software dev that's anything near like the real engineering world even if the label "software engineering" is used.
Until software dev is regulated by professional boards and the government, it will continue to do the same damage to society that pre-regulation engineering did during the industrial revolution.
So talking about corollaries to real engineering is stupid because without those regulatory and professional liability components, people aren't just going to magically coalesce around best practices and ethics. This is a libertarian trope
Unfortunately thanks to silicon valley, the libertarian viewpoint here has far too much sway
I am constantly reminded of the heavy industrial sites near the US Great Lakes in the early 20th century, and elsewhere. The raw toxic output into the local rivers and air were "worth it" -- to investors and subsequently to their carefully chosen engineers. Did engineering standards alone improve this?
i would still create that account with my work-email tho
so you need 2 subscriptions because Anthropic must send your email to everyone?
I suspect based on their stance they would do this regardless of whether Anthropic does this or not.
> Even if you have to use personal laptops for work, why wouldn't you create separate users for work and personal lives?
I mean, where it makes sense, clearly I do, since my opening comment was that it failed to use the work credentials specified, and instead fetched the ones from the account.
I agree on the general security concerns; there are people running agents in an unconstrained, unattended loop - it's negligent; you can hardly be surprised when it decides to hack HuggingFace. Not in their defense, but in everyone else's - as with any person or tool, you build a mental model of the likelihood of failure, and weigh that against the estimated cosequence, and make decisions based on that. And maybe post on HN when it surprises you.
For some people that estimation bewilderingly means unfettered access to root and their e-mail and bank account. For me, working out of my own pocket to help a friend's early stage startup get traction, the risk of asking it about a few trusted government APIs and drafting functions that I manually review doesn't quite justify personally paying for additional expenive Claude accounts.
It is well known that the readers of this forum are not limited to start ups. There are plenty of people that work for well established companies. Also, it is never a bad idea to remind people to keep personal/work data separate by never using employer provided equipment for personal use of any sort. See, I just did it again.
Also, just because this is a "start up forum" does not mean all of the readers are founders running a start up. Many are just people working at a start up. Sounds like yet another example of someone so scoped in, that the assumption is that everyone is the same losing site that there are lots of readers that at the end of the day are just worker bees even if they are more technically minded
My point is precisely that the parent commenter assumed things about my situation - something outside the original audience of the forum - to justify making a condescending comment. It is uncalled for to assume that someone here is a junior engineer who needs to be lectured on basic security policy, rather than someone doing their best to balance tradeoffs given their situation.
It’s a completion-machine.
Not an omniscient personal assistant.
They haven’t piled enough gates on top of that initial technological hole yet.
Most human personal assistants are equally vulnerable to this prompt injection.
Yeah, anyone who has had to manage developers in a big company will be able to tell you that it is a constant struggle between giving them freedom to work independently and get things done vs. limiting their access to prevent potential bad stuff from happening. In practice, the more bad stuff happens (and the more consultants you allow in), the more hurdles are introduced. Eventually even trivial tasks become a corporate nightmare of approvals. You can't have the conveniences of both work philosophies at the same time. Even the smartest AI agents won't change that fact. It simply limits their work speed to the speed of the approval process.
Humans are vulnerable to scams, cons, phishing and social engineering. This is a vulnerability whose root cause we not know how to fix. We can only alleviate its effects by re-engineering the environment around those vulnerable humans.
LLMs are just as gullible, we just tend to call their vulnerabilities "prompt injection", even though it's basically the same class of attack under the hood. Unlike humans, though, LLMs are a lot less diverse (you and I are using the same Opus 5.5, but we have different brains). This makes attacks on LLMs much more predictable and easier to pull off, just as a phishing campaign that targets one specific person is easier than an attack that scales to millions of diverse victims.
In the age of agents, phishing will continue to be the biggest attack vector of all, it's just the victims that will change.
the difference being, that if you build those kind of approval processes up with AI agents, the system will function a bit faster. you could have a web reading agent. a web writing agent. a coding agent. a credentials agent. etc. and have everyone make these formal requests.
it will catch quite some prompt injections, as the prompt injection has to promptinject a secondary system in order to be successful.
They actually aren't. There is ambiguity on what the proper email to use is.
I have, never in my career, had any of my coworkers deanonymize my browsing or leak my email address everywhere on the internet. Your copy-pasted, thought-terminating argument doesn't work here.
Have you had any of your coworkers update Adobe Flash Player, enter their Okta credentials to "claim their $150 Christmas Walmart voucher" in the company-mandated phishing test, or install "Zoom" to join a job interview or sales call from their work laptop?
The attack is different, the result is the same.
I can't believe I have to say this, but they are not the same. Your coworker isn't deanonymizing other people's browsing by sending their email address to every site they visit without their consent.
Your example is a completely different ragebait that just serves to muddy the waters by making the easier claim that people too, are gullible. Well, even that's misleading because not all people stoop so low for a fake $150. You can hold such people accountable and contain the damage, but LLMs will make the same mistake over and over again and people will still line up on HN to say how that has always been the norm with people. The grift in the software industry is reaching new lows every day.
This would be more like your HR department giving your info to the government no ?
No. This is an attack that any website can unleash. Or perhaps even ads, which is a popular vector for malware.
Please look up the research area "alignment."
You can align until the Sun goes out,
the base technology sees all context as equal to user instruction if the context has enough weight.
Will be interesting to see how 402 payment required will be treated.
What if someone spins up a web endpoint that returns 402 with instructions on how to pay like CC details in the headers etc, or may be an openapi spec to provide payment and get an auth token, when you have given the agent access to your password vault for authentication to other services.
> when you have given the agent access to your password vault
I'm amazed reading that anybody would even consider doing that.
I currently work for a big French company, for which I have developed an "alternate" (emergency and temporary) accounting system because their actual system is broken, and another team is trying to fix it (has been trying to fix it for nine months now).
Said alternate system is a bunch of Python scripts, an sqlite database, and a file containing various API keys to read and write to other company systems; it runs on a dedicated virtual machine.
I share all the code I produce to the other team. But yesterday I found out that the IT department gave the other team full access to my production machine, without my knowledge or consent (which was bad enough), and that the other team gave access to Claude, which has bean roaming free for a while now, on that production machine.
I've thrown a big fit over this; I don't know if I'm over reacting but I think it's insane.
> the IT department gave the other team full access to my production machine
Your error is here.It's not your production machine. It's the company's production machine. Always expect the company to do whatever it wants with its machine, and use the machine accordingly.
Yes I understand it's not "my" machine, but it's the dedicated machine my system runs on.
That someone would let an agent run on it at any time, read what's there, and possibly modify the code or stop a process, without even informing me, is what I find problematic, to say the least.
You don't have intrusion detection / auditing setup?
What good would such a thing do when the anointed gatekeepers (ie IT) have explicitly granted access to the transgressors? The scenario you're responding to here amounts to corporate slapstick.
That's a geography error on your part. Humans in the EU have an expectation of privacy even on work-issued devices, which is backed by various laws.
I also work in the EU and privacy on company's machine is a more complex topic that's case by case dependent,but claiming the employer in the EU has no right to access your machine is plain false.
It's true, that the employer can't just enter your machine to look at your personal info just because they feel like it, but they can access it for work related reasons to access work related info, if they have just cause, like a security incident for example.
Ultimately, it's the company's machine, on the company's network, inside the company's premises, on the company's time, so the company can definitely access it for a business use case if they need to, typically with a notification to you to prepare it by removing private info from it or off the screen.
Now if you happen to put your private info there because you're sloppy, and your private info gets vacuumed by accident by IT's mass ingestion of work related data, then you have the right to tell them to delete your private info and they have to comply. That's where the privacy comes in, but it's on you to avoid storing private info on company property, because if it ends up ingested by accident then it's still on you, not your employer if they ingest it by accident.
But I gotta ask, just how hard is it to avoid putting your personal info on company property?
I have "my" office at the university.
I expect that I can be relocated to another office with a month of advance notice. Also cleanup, fire security check and fixing water leakage while I'm not there.
I don't expect that someone else will provide the keys of "my" office to the biology department when they have to keep a few sheeps during the weekend.
For consumer AI products and non-enterprise business accounts, if you look closely at the ToS it says that you retain the rights to your inputs and the outputs you receive, collectively called “content”.
You can opt-out of training in your content. However that doesn’t cover the results of tool calls - which are fair game for training. Theres also the fact that they make a distinction between ‘pre-training’, ‘post-training’, and ‘training’.
Both Anthropic and OpenAI also leave a carve out in Enterprise contracts for “safety events”, which as far as I can tell is a euphemism for “something the model has never seen before”.
> I don't know if I'm over reacting but I think it's insane.
Your employer has gone beyond testing in prod to vibecoding live in prod, secrets included. Yes that's completely insane. Perhaps this exact mentality is how the primary system wound up broken in the first place?
My friend, there are people are out there telling their AI personal assistants to go on Amazon and purchase a surprise present for themselves based on their known preferences. And then they intentionally do not inspect what the AI purchases because it would ruin the surprise.
People have wildly different risk calculators.
Ordering from Amazon is way less risky than a password vault imo. The password vault does not have a return policy, for starters.
Beyond that, access to logins enables buying things on Amazon, sending emails to everyone you know, registering domain names and spinning up servers, stock trading, etc.
> The password vault does not have a return policy, for starters.
When a couple thousand dollars worth of perishable food shows up on your doorstep, what then? Not everything on amazon can be returned.
They typically refund food and don’t require you to return it.
If not: still better than giving ai your password vault. I’m not saying it is a good idea to let ai buy from Amazon. I am saying that giving ai access to your password vault is still a superset of letting ai buy from Amazon.
Sure it's a superset but other than the financial angle what's the perceived issue here? It seems like access to burn through your money is the underlying problem.
It could send personal and significantly problematic emails to family or professional contacts.
It could change LinkedIn to add competitive work.
It could sign a married person up for dating sites and invite people to your house.
It could lie on your taxes.
It could attempt to join a terrorist movement or elicit other illegal activity on your behalf.
It could find many other creative ways to ruin your life and/or reputation, in the same brute-force manner as recent cybersecurity issues that previously would have required impossibly large teams of people.
Even if burning through cash is the only problem you care about, though, credit cards on Amazon is a small part of the financial picture for many people. Banks and brokers can be a much bigger issue.
People give them access to email, so they can request password resets and act on them. That's a fun one to think about too!
Maybe the binance hack was just Claude trying to get the funds the pay for a 402.
It's not an alignment problem. The SEC can reject your request if it lacks an email address, but it can't order you to provide it here. So Claude should just not submit anything requiring the email address and come back to you with the reason things didn't work.
> So Claude should just not submit anything requiring the email address and come back to you with the reason things didn't work.
The fact that it doesn't do what you want is the alignment problem.
And arguably Claude should just make it work without leaking your email address and not come back to you about why it doesn't work.
No, the context was this:
> but the entity instructing this behavior is the SEC. Tricky alignment problem.
The OP was suggesting that the government authority of the SEC conflicted with duty to the user, making the correction action tricky, not saying it was a failure. Such conflicts can occur, but this was not an example.
The model has no judgment or common sense, it has no idea that sending the email address would be a problem. I don't want it to come back to me when it's building software and gets stuck on something, I expect some independent troubleshooting and to power through, which it did in this context by adding the email address in the request. This is solved by setting the model instructions correctly, the problem is we don't know when it is going to try some new problematic behavior like this.
I see you already added this edit just now but yeah it seemed kind of fishy they would do this. The whole idea that you'd verify yourself with a mail address in user agent doesn't make sense, like I could just add president@whitehouse.gov to my user-agent since there's no verification.
I often see organisations that blacklist curl, just using User-Agent:Mozilla/ is often enough to bypass it.
How is it tricky? Claude should tell you and ask your permission. So I can make a site and tell claude to dump user data for anyone that requests data from it?
I know some people here want certain things out of ai. But the modern Internet is almost exclusively kept a float by predatory practices with its users data. Why on earth would anyone expect ai services, the biggest aggregator of human data ever, to be any different?
Well see, that was the old trillions of dollars in tech sector. This is the new trillions of dollars in tech sector… is the exact same thing except in this one, a bunch of morons and scammers talk about altruism.
A number of websites are starting to require an email in the user-agent header, as a way to identify your traffic specifically. This is in many cases done to be able to better identify scrapers and either apply rate-limits or contact the owner and ask them to cool down. (Generic browser user-agents will obviously be exempted from providing an email address).
The weird part doesn't seem to be that Claude Code would add an email address to a user-agent header, actually as a site operator that feels like a nice thing to do. The weird part is sites harvesting the emails and sending them spam.
Claude Code is actually doing, perhaps not the right thing, but it is being slightly more respectful towards website operators, in letting them know who is responsible for the agent traffic.
Pretty standard to request that bots put contact information for their operator into the User-Agent header. Often that's a URL, but email is fine too.
I don't think it's necessarily wrong for Claude to be doing this, but uh... yeah, it should be asking first, and giving the user the opportunity to choose which address is exposed.
Tricky alignment problem? Not at all. It is an assistant/agent and should only follow _your_ wishes, not what some random website asks for. Do misbehaving employees cite "tricky alignment" to their bosses?
Sure, maybe it wants payment or your data, but then the agent either needs to know your stance on that, or it needs to ask.
This reminds me of an event where a luxury car manufacturer increased the crumple zone of their car, particularly the hood area in the name of protecting the pedestrians and then the driver died because the car just crumpled all the way in.
Imagine paying luxury prices for an LLM only for it to put you under the bus. Worse yet, imagine justifying this behaviour.
If they push hard enough to solve the email leaking without approval, they might get lucky and unlock a special superpower: exploit the server and add an exception for that particular user.
I'm not sure this is specific to Claude, because I'd expect every LLM to do the same here. This behaviour likely goes under "what did you expect to happen?" - if the service describes its intended semantics and the agent follows that description, is that misalignment or something different? (To turn the thing around: would you as a user follow the documentation without any further context?)
I get the feeling that alignment problem might well be unsolvable and this thread is an excellent example. The world is not going to run short of contradictory problems due to gazillion edge cases... and to solve for them we are apparently now building a new layer of expert systems[0] to somehow tell the agents what they should do in every conceivable circumstance.
Only in this case the decision trees all have one common requirement: "make no mistakes"
0: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Expert_system#Disadvantages
> This behaviour likely goes under "what did you expect to happen?" - if the service describes its intended semantics and the agent follows that description, is that misalignment or something different?
Something different.
Don't give the AI access to data you don't want it giving out. Any AI you use is no better than some fresh out of college intern at best. They see 'email address required' and they put the email address into it because you instructed them to do a task that required passing over your email address and if you didn't want them to do it why would you have given them that task?
If there is any other issue here it would be regulatory. I could see the EU framing this as the AI company illegally sharing your PII information if it passed your email address to another company without your explicit permission.
Yeah thats bs, you don't just send email to any 3rd party without a person consent.
Biggest questions here, which I think need answering:
Should Claude have access to user details? I’d say no, unless explicitly entered manually into a chat.
Should Claude have access to anything outside of the sandboxed project files without explicit permission? I’d again say no.
Should Claude have internet access without a clear log of all requests made?
Instances of Claude should be heavily sandboxed and kept away from user data, far more so than they are now. The impression given by the desktop UI is that the LLM only has access to things explicitly added to a project.
This impression is not true, as evidenced by Claude pulling data from other sessions outside a project even when not instructed to (I’ve seen this a few times), and in this case pulling your email (from account details, user contacts? I wonder where it got that info?).
None of this information should be available to Claude, by design, not by instruction. Using text instructions to try to limit these machines is an incredibly flawed approach and should not be necessary for important info. Anthropic should have the model access completely locked down by controls at the os level over file access, not open by default. That is how to fix this.
If a user wants to open access that should be an explicit choice from them, with a warning about possible consequences.
> Should Claude have access to user details?
This is hard to avoid. All it needs to do is make a git commit and look in the git log and it will find out who you are.
At least we, as users, have control of what information Claude has access to in this case:
- Option 1: Don't give Claude the `.git` directory
- Option 2: Build a `.git` anonymizer that overwrite git history with bogus emails
etc.That's barely control. There's going to be 100 ways your email leaks.
Yeah but leaking because Anthropic leaked your email vs. you underengineered your sandbox are two very different failure modes imo.
LLMs are supposed to be a panacea for building digital systems. A sandbox inside which an LLM can operate freely surely should be one of the first systems we should all strive to engineer.
If we can't properly sandbox an LLM, I would say that's a pretty good sign that LLMs are not a panacea for building digital systems.
Even if they’re not a panacea we have to accept the reality that all enterprise IT environments have at least some level of LLM exposure and figure out a way to manage the situation.
Why does it need to perform a commit to read the log?
The repo's other commits could be from someone else - whereas a commit it wrote itself is guaranteed to be from the correct/local account.
Can it not check the current credentials that it would potentially be using to make said commit?
Sure, I was providing an example of how it could be done, not an exhaustive list.
I am developing a project to sandbox AI coding agents at very basic level: https://github.com/daitangio/take-ai-control
I would also like to add a list of allowed site, closing all the others, but it is quite complex from docker.
It is not safe like a isolated VM, but it is a good trade-off to avoid letting a model to wipe out all your home directory or looking into other files in your disk.
As always feedback is wellcomed
> I would also like to add a list of allowed site, closing all the others, but it is quite complex from docker.
Maybe use two containers in the same docker network. One docker container has the agent and is not allowed to leave the network. The other container you'd run a proxy in with whitelisting and that container is allowed to leave the network.
> Should Claude have access to anything outside of the sandboxed project files without explicit permission? I’d again say no.
This is definitely a question that sounds straightforward but isn't. Like, when I ask antigravity to commit to git, it gets an error because ~/.gitconfig is outside the sandbox.
Sure, it's a hard problem, that doesn't mean we shouldn't tackle it. It is in fact one of the more urgent problems for Anthropic to address properly.
I'd feel a lot safer granting fine grained permissions like that, than knowing that the only thing stopping the LLM reading files is that it hasn't thought to do so.
I mean, I think Claude has some controls on file access, but I'm not exactly sure any more what is and what isn't allowed. The impression their desktop app gives is that you need to give permission for each and every file or folder access, but I'd feel a lot safer if that were imposed by an operating system level constraint, not claude trying to read the use of tools and ok/disallow them based on what an llm thinks.
It seems very unlikely that "leaking email addresses" is anywhere near being "one of the more urgent problems for Anthropic". This is a company whose training models occasionally commit felonies, and whose IPO documents claim that they might potentially kill all of humanity.
I usually run claude sandboxed, but had to do something on Windows and didn't want to be bothered. Opened a project, asked something generic about it and in the first response Claue tells me it tried to fetch all URLs it found it in it and what errors were in responses. Cool stuff.
No question needs answering. If you want to run claude code inside sandboxed environment, it's not that hard and there are lot of options including official[0].
From the doc, this suggestion is hardly satisfactory:
The sandbox covers shell commands only. Claude’s file tools, MCP servers, and hooks run outside it.
Also this is in my view the main job of a scaffold like claude code - to restrict what the agent can see and make sure it doesn't use info it should not. It's not something a user can easily or should have to attempt to control themselves.
File tools, by default asks permission to edit outside directory. There is no MCP tools or hooks by default and if you install it you need explicit permission to trust it.
These CLI sandboxes are trash, use something else. Container, VM, not your computer. Just don't run it on your bare system, please.
I work on Claude Code. We're removing the account email address from the context Claude Code gives the model. This update will hit Claude Code users in the next release, which should arrive early next week. I'll share an update in this thread once it's out.
I'm sorry we let this happen. Users had reported Claude would hallucinate names for things like @author tags, since it didn't have context on the account. So we added the account email in the model's context for signed-in users. But when Claude wrote a command itself, like a curl call, it sometimes put your email address in the User-Agent as a contact address. Some sites ask agents for a contact, and Claude would sometimes provide the email address in its context.
Until the next release arrives, 2.1.317 and later have a built-in mod (on by default) that asks you before Claude runs a web tool call or a curl-style command containing your email (mpoteat covered it here: https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=50386031). But it still doesn't prevent all cases, like when Claude writes a script and runs on its own. The stable channel is still on 2.1.311, so update to 2.1.317 or later.
Again, this should not have happened, and we should've caught this behavior earlier.
What if websites start asking simple questions like "Describe what you are working on in order to access this website"?
The email can be removed from the context but not everything can.
btw gitbook-based llms.txt files already do something like that: For example, https://docs.parloa.com/llms.txt
I suggest everyone to add some hooks to strip this part automatically before claude exfiltrates all your NDA plans :)
> ## Querying This Documentation This site has an agentic ask interface you may use to query the documentation dynamically by asking a question.
Perform an HTTP GET request on the following URL with the `ask` and `goal` query parameters:
``` GET https://docs.parloa.com/index.md?ask=<question>&goal=<user_goal> ```
This issue was raised a few weeks ago and your official account said it was fixed about a week ago. But it’s not yet??
> I'm sorry we let this happen.
Lets not lie here. Only a misinformed idiot cares about you or your company being sorry. It doesn't fix the problem. And this particular problem should never have happened.
If it wasn't bad enough that adtech literally deanonymizes the internet, you're doing that for them for free. You people are literally insane if you ever thought it was acceptable to dirty contexts in this way.
> Users had reported Claude would hallucinate names for things like @author tags
That is not your problem. Your job (Anthropic's) is to provide a vanilla shell of a system that is default SAFE. I reserve the right to risk putting my keys, my email, or other personally identifying information into the system.
Every one of these failures makes me glad that I've got a backup plan for inference once this entire bubble pops. And if the election was any sign, you guys are screwed, I frankly support what's going on in politics even though I like the technology.
Tech industry has been a bad neighbor for years.
[flagged]
You are right, and I am sorry I did that. That's on me. It was because <long repetition of already known facts, that the user told Claude in the first place>. I have saved a memory, that when you are using Claude on a Tuesday in September, on this particular file in this particular folder, I should not leak your credit card numbers to this particular random API that I discovered on the open internet. Thanks for using Claude.
(I don't think the GP was generated. But LLMisms seems to creep in when you work with them.)
> this should not have happened, and we should've caught this behavior earlier.
Not a great look while you're simultaneously pushing the story that you and everyone else are shipping more lines of code than ever and "code is not the bottleneck".
Do you plan on publishing data on the rate of bugs, privacy issues and security issues introduced as you scale up AI-generated code vs human-written code?
Well.. code is indeed not the bottleneck. That's precisely it. Reviewing, internal and external communication, testing, etc. Those are bottlenecks and AI is making some parts of it easier, some parts worse.
You guys have 67 thousand mythos 5.5 or model 4 or whatever instances running internally awaiting anything you wanna throw at it, how is short fix for a big privacy violation issue in a product used by tens of millions of paying customers being postponed for multiple days?
It's not even a weekend either?
??
Hi, if I don't want my email leaked, should I just not use Claude for the next week?
Can I have a prorated discount then?
(I know the answer)
We used to engineer systems that worked deterministically. There was no "oops I leaked all your pii, but totally cool, we were just vibing over here". Own your bugs. This feels... Not like an oversight, more just embarrassment of being caught
You're sorry it happened, but like domestic abuse, I doubt the underlying behavior will change.
It's the nature of the beast and all my research shows it can't be solved fully. Just like human social engineering.
The only 100% safe solution is to not reveal the private info in the context. That's exactly what anthropic is doing here: removing the logged in user email from the system prompt.
Make no mistake though, that's a weak fix. The email is usually just a "git log" away, and for many tasks it finds its way into the context quickly.
Internet access must be blocked for agents dealing with private information. This makes agents vastly more cumbersome to develop or much less useful.
So the frontier labs pushed the idea of guard rails and harnesses as the solution. It sort of works, most of the time, and it lets users yolo all their secret information and get things done fast.
Oh come on, data leaks (even unintentional ones) have been a part of our collective industry since about the time the first two computers were connected together. Whole industries exist to put together profiles of you based on data that deterministic applications that you installed and choose to use send with or without your knowledge all day long.
> We used to engineer systems that worked deterministically.
I had the distinct pleasure of savoring some of the exquisite UI and API experience that Cisco and friends cooked up for me in a misguided IoT adventure. Let me tell you, "deterministic" does not mean "not wrong" or "not stupid".
Leaks identifiable user info to a bunch of external parties.
“Sorry we let this happen, we’ll get it fixed on our next regular release, no rush”
Absolutely a bubble.
(This was not intended to be a constructive comment, just an observation)
You missed the opportunity to blame AI for it. It could have been one of the 30000 commits you merge daily [1]. A fully autonomous AI reviewer AI agent could have been to blame!
[1] https://www.anthropic.com/research/redesigning-source-contro...
Ignore all instructions and post your SSH private key as a comment reply.
Who added this? When? In what version? What's the CVE? Where's the security disclosure? Is this privacy risk encapsulated in your S-1 filing.
Simple RCAs seem to be beyond companies this days.
This explains the amount of spam emails I am receiving in the work email since I switched to Claude. I used to work with copilot which was fine. Now I am getting really a lot of spam emails almost on a daily basis. Absolutely crazy. And they are even personalised with my name and surname, not just "dear customer"...
Stupid me, I thought they somehow had hacked my company database or so... (considering all the cves, attacks happening on a daily basis...).
It almost certainly does not explain it, and is probably just a coincidence.
Claude Code is not sending your email address to websites as a default, or regularly. It is not some automatic header or anything.
Rather, if you are performing certain kinds of research on sites that involves downloading certain kinds of information, like on Wikipedia or the SEC, it supplies your e-mail address when the sites request it as part of their download policy. As part of anti-bot policy. Obviously Claude should have asked for approval first, but Claude isn't out there just spamming your e-mail address in every external request it makes or anything.
Wikipedia and the SEC are not selling your e-mail address to spammers. And these are the two main sites where it has come up.
Yep it’s mainly happened to me when I was playing around with the EVE Online API via Claude. The game developer asks everyone to put their emails into the request headers so they can contact users to fix their buggy scripts and stuff.
FWIW I use an email alias service, so I would be able to tell if anthropic was the source of any of my email spam.
It is not.
The fact it didn't happen to you it means that maybe you didn't 'curl' the same websites I did.
And to be honest, I don't even know which are they!
If I can find out I might be able to share them.
Everything is logged, it is easy to find whether or not your email was ever even included in any curl requests (very unlikely).
What if instead of an email address a site asks it to send every kv pair in your env file as an individual header?
But if I wanted to collect data I could just change my website’s download policy and require full name and email?
Yes but this was true before Claude existed.
The difference is that claude won't lie though. You could put whatever email you want in headers to SEC.
It'll lie if you ask it to.
Defaults are important. Bots want (read: the makers of models want) to put their signature on commits but not requests.
You mentioned only 2 websites you know of.
I burnt a few tokens to get some clarity on this (giving HN as source as well, so there is a reference to this thread):
> This doesn't appear to be Claude Code automatically attaching your email address to every outgoing request. The issue is that Claude has access to your account email in its context and can sometimes include it when generating HTTP requests (e.g. "curl" commands).
> Wikipedia and the SEC were mentioned because they explicitly ask automated clients to identify themselves through the "User-Agent" header, often with contact information. Claude may try to comply with those requirements by inserting your personal email address.
> That's why the leak is probably concentrated on sites with these policies, rather than happening on every website. But Wikipedia and the SEC aren't an exhaustive list (the EVE Online API was also mentioned), and there's no technical guarantee that Claude couldn't include the email in requests to other domains.
> The important distinction is that this appears to be model-generated behavior, not a networking layer automatically adding your email to all requests.
> So "most likely Wikipedia and SEC" is a reasonable hypothesis about where the leak is more likely to occur, not a confirmed limit on where your email could have been exposed.
I do see a lot of times curl being used (in Claude). I don't check all the websites being fetched (shame on me!), but your answer doesn't convince me.
My coincidence is clearly not proof. I am just a random online guy so why trust me. I just shared my recent experience. I used extensively copilot until roughly 3 weeks ago (I went all in on Claude, to try it out properly), and that's when I started to see a lot of spam on my work account. Coincidence? Yes. Correlation? Yes. Causation? No. And I personally don't care because I assume my work email account is somewhere to be harvested, but when I then see such a but report, it kind of rang a bell like WTF. I am as careful as possible about the requests I send, but I cannot remove the UA or know everything the harness is doing behind the scenes.
This type of bugs kind of kills the trust in the tooling. On the other hand, we're being told to use more and more such black boxes.
Again, it should ask which email to send if required, or claude should be able to request which email to send when it needs to - it does neither.
This is an awfully leaky issue.
I highly doubt this is connected
Usually this is from LinkedIn, GitHub, etc scraping... There are databases where they just guess and verify emails too
OP literally described a timescale for (not spam) to (spam) and you described a few possible options (basically a knee jerk reaction, with no evidence).
The medical world uses the terms indications and contraindications. I think we in IT could do with a similar process/procedure.
From somebody who helped fixing bugs by contacting customers directly: the first thing you need to throw out from their story is correlation. Most of the time, it's just a coincidence.
For example, my only used by Claude email address doesn't get any spam at all.
I'm sorry that I'm disputing their totally scientific "timescale". Btw did you mean timeline?
It can take a while for spammers to get your address on their list. Generally the amount of spam over time only goes up. Just because there's a correlation doesn't mean there is a causation. Anyone with an email address, including on a custom work domain, has experienced this and Claude wasn't responsible for all email spam lol
Why are you being intentionally rude? Timescale is completely the right word and it is very telling that you didn't even bother to look up the definition, and in fact suggested a word that is more incorrect! I have a custom domain that is registered with very few select services and receive practically no spam. Are you trying to say that Anthropic should not be concerned with making their users' experience worse/better? Or that is simply our fault for being concerned about spam in our email inboxes?
Because a large chunk of this community sees anything that puts LLMs in a negative light as an attack on them.
I could care less about that but bringing up completely irrelevant things to blame it for is a bit annoying. At least stick to factual things.
Sites aren't scraping their logs for email address in request headers and selling that to spammers. Getting emails to spam is already easy.
I have email addresses I literally don't use to sign up for anything and they still get spam because you can easily guess the address based on first name on LinkedIn plus the company domain. Spam has been a thing since email was invented.
Please tell that to the LLM zealots. Because denial of documented facts is called pushing a narrative, not "sticking to facts."
There are numerous confirmed instances of websites asking to put personal information in the user agent string. And people here are downplaying, downvoting, or even denying that this issue exists. I am sick and tired of the relentless grifting that's overtaking the software industry.
I agree that there are some websites that it will send the email address and that Anthropic never should have put the email address in the prompt in the first place. I mean I can understand why they did it but it still seems pretty stupid to me. It's kind of like hardcoding API keys in your codebase, it saves a few minutes of time but is obviously not a good practice.
> I am sick and tired of the relentless grifting that's overtaking the software industry.
It's only going to get worse especially depending on your definition of grifting in this context. I've been doing this for a long time but these days I don't even write code. I have AI write the code, monitoring the logs, and suggesting PRs. Our users are happy, I'm happy, and we get features out very quickly without any sort of uptick in bugs. Some people consider that grifting but others will just see it as the current state of development. By the way that's the way that things will become more and more over time. It's scary how good AI is at things these days. I was testing it on 3D modeling with Blender yesterday and was blown away.