OpenSSH 10.6p2 has been released with a workaround for a critical vulnerability

hachyderm.io

185 points by Animux 2 days ago


https://alpinelinux.org/posts/2026-11-05-openssh-password-au...

NewJazz - 2 days ago

musl’s crypt() returns the string * as an error indicator when the key is over 256 bytes long. * is also exactly what the stored field contains for every account with no password, so the “hash” matches and the login succeeds.

Does anyone know why musl does this? Are they the only C library that behaves this way?

For a C library that famously tries to adhere to POSIX as much as possible, this seems like a crazy choice. From POSIX standard:

Upon successful completion, crypt() shall return a pointer to the encoded string. The first two bytes of the returned value shall be those of the salt argument. Otherwise, it shall return a null pointer and set errno to indicate the error.

https://pubs.opengroup.org/onlinepubs/9699919799/functions/c...

amluto - 2 days ago

Wow, what a bug. I expect the exploit is literally as simple as trying to ssh in as a user with the password has ‘*’ in /etc/shadow and typing anything as the password.

To the extent that systems that are configured in the vulnerable manner exist in the wild, I’m surprised they weren’t exploited years ago by trivial ssh bots.

P.S. Wow, I’m reminded of just how awful traditional UNIX-y C APIs and code are.

P.P.S. The musl code in question is nuts. The API it implements is awful. Seriously, here’s the manpage:

https://man.archlinux.org/man/crypt.3.en

You can’t call this function correctly. sshd’s “fix” is basically to assume that a too-short return is an error return instead of a success return.

PAM is also awful, but this is worse.

dust42 - 2 days ago

> We are making this release as fast as possible (we learned of the problem yesterday) because we have recently observed multiple cases of rapid bug rediscovery by AI agents, sometimes within hours, and so now consider long embargo periods to be a dangerous practice that primarily benefits attackers.

I think this will likely become standard. Nevertheless, a few stormy months are ahead.

throwa356262 - 2 days ago

musl only, the quick fix:

     PasswordAuthentication=no

Which is a good advice in general.
MPSimmons - 2 days ago

Is this actually effective against Alpine? The default install seems to use ! as the placeholder in /etc/shadow instead of * and trying the attack doesn't seem to work.

0127 - 2 days ago

IMO this is where languages like Rust shine. The design patterns built into the language for handling errors (Result) - force you to handle errors / function results with sentinels, null pointers, or errnos are so much more error prone than handling a Result<T,E> using a match statement.

crypt() returning `*` is insane especially since these kinds of sentinels are all over /etc/passwd

feearent - 2 days ago

Not really related to the topic, but AI-popular sentences and language structure stand out to people right away these days right? I noticed some.

"If you cannot update yet, at least disable password logins: set PasswordAuthentication no in your sshd configuration and restart sshd. Either one closes the hole." (only AI would characterize a critical SSH implementation vulnerability as a hole closing game)

An attacker who can reach your SSH port can log in without knowing any password. It takes one connection, works every time, and needs no retries. (It sounds like the writer is bragging about the exploit instead of describing it. AI does this)

The attacker needs the name of an account whose password field is * (an account with no password set, which is normal for key-only accounts), and needs the machine to have at least one other account with a $5$ or $6$ password hash. The attacker then sends a very long password (257 to 1024 bytes). One user with a password is enough: it makes every account without one reachable. (same as above made stronger with the 'statement: statement2' format)

"Users coming from a directory service through musl-nscd (nslcd, winbind, sssd), since they have no shadow entry." (a human would be more clear about what a shadow entry is and give more context, I think)

Hmm the rest of the article (the remaining 70-80%) seems quite human.

Anyway, not sure why I spent 10+ minutes on this. It just jumps at me right away.

Kuraj - 2 days ago

> At least one local account has a $5$ or $6$ password hash.

I'm not sure this gets the point across when (according to https://sshhole.com/) it effectively means "any other user with a real password"

SV_BubbleTime - 2 days ago

> because we have recently observed multiple cases of rapid bug rediscovery by AI agents, sometimes within hours, and so now consider long embargo periods to be a dangerous practice that primarily benefits attackers.

Seems quite reasonable. It’s quite obvious that black hats have day jobs as White hats and have been privy to embargoes for probably decades.

drob518 - 2 days ago

Given Alpine’s broad use in the Docker ecosystem, this is going to hit a lot of folks, I think.

asdfsa32 - 2 days ago

Who does PasswordAuthentication=yes in this day and age anyway.

jmclnx - 2 days ago

>We consider the root cause of this bug to be outside OpenSSH itself, but we're in a good position to deliver a mitigation quickly.

So not a ssh issue but an issue specific to Linux using "musl libc without PAM".

crest - 2 days ago

I'm sure some people running lightweight containers just had a heart attack.

wordswords3 - a day ago

The potential affected space is huge.. it does not matter if most docker images ship without openssh.. it does not matter that most security conscious image builders do not enable plain passwordauth.. it does not matter that ssh port is not commonly exposed.. the amount of alpine docker images in current live use over the whole internet is such a vastly huge number that you're going to bet that even given a small percentage of those 'misusing' docker and their containers being affected is still going to result in a a huge number of affected containers.

- 2 days ago
[deleted]
slopinthebag - 2 days ago

i think it's just unbelievable there isn't a bigger push to move away from c to languages that can prevent stuff like this from happening. this and just the pure unsafety. it's 2026. it's like pure negligence at this point, the equivalent of building a bridge with matchsticks because you like using it more.