Residential proxies detected on White House network
layer3intel.com1267 points by Rasbora 3 days ago
1267 points by Rasbora 3 days ago
https://krebsonsecurity.com/2026/11/want-to-rent-an-internet...
The danger here, of course, is that while these compromised devices are currently being monetized in a relatively benign way (other than bandwidth costs to the user, which to be sure can be nontrivial)… it would be naive to assume that there isn't a Command and Control capability that can assign less benign tasking - or can be compromised to do so. This also puts some of the troubling reports that politicians were bringing phones into SCIFs into context… > benign On a server that used to get below 1k HTTP requests a day, I've had several cases of mass scraping from these botnets exceeding 100req/s. The web is getting harder and harder to use due to all the anti-bot mechanisms site operators had to put up. How is DDOSing every site on the web benign? Relatively benign. A compromised device inside the White House network could presumably be doing something _much_ worse than participating in a DDOS against random websites. And it's right there in the second line of the article: > One of the proxy services is a Russian company whose founder’s web hosting business was ground zero for cyberattacks against election systems in Arizona and Illinois in 2016. Surely a Russian company known for cyberattacks against the US having direct access to the White House network is far more serious than just DDOSing random websites. This is espionage at the highest level. (Again.) The owner of the proxy is not great, but the fact that its an open door to snoop on everything else on the entire network is the realy fucker there. >> A compromised device inside the White House network A whitehouse network. It isn't like everything done in that building run through a single wifi router. It is likely an unprotected network for personal use with zero connecting to anything important. If the progression of security over the last couple years has made anything clear, it's that letting the barbarians knock down a couple of walls because "well we have more walls" is not a winning defense strategy. The barbarians are very creative and will often exploit the inch you give in unexpected ways. Great, they have some isolated network. What are the chances it _never_ touches a device with a path to an important computer (e.g., one core router or switch at some point)? Good thing there haven't been any Cisco/Juniper/etc vulnerabilities ever. What are the chances no important device _ever_ touches this isolated network? No important person ever gets annoyed at the security/filtering on the secured network and decides to connect to the public one instead? The secured one has some sort of issue, so their phone decides to connect to the guest network? Are they going to compromise the military C&C network in the underground bunker? Probably not. But it's probably more realistically damaging if they were to compromise some high level staffer's phone and using it as a listening device in a bunch of mid-level Whitehouse meetings. Remember all the senior people are engaged in blatant corruption and illegality. So you're looking at not just national security stuff, but the ability to get personal data like selfies of fucking goats or screenshots of Maltese & Azerbaijan bank transfers, etc. Makes it easy for nefarious parties to manipulate standing with POTUS and blackmail people. The only escape for many of these people is pardons. [flagged] Apparently they do not though. There were experts but the Republican White House fired them: https://techcrunch.com/2025/03/11/doge-axes-cisa-red-team-st... Perhaps some of them annoyed the President's illegally-appointed mega-donor, if they spoke out against giving root access to all his unvetted junior flunkies. The same junior flunkies who would do things like go to government agencies, create administrative accounts, which would then, often with minutes, be seen connecting from Russia and Eastern Europe with the correct credentials. Source? > Daniel J. Berulis, a cybersecurity architect with the NLRB, filed a whistleblower complaint alleging that within 15 minutes of DOGE team members creating new user credentials and demanding administrative access, multiple login attempts using those exact credentials originated from a Russian IP address https://www.npr.org/2025/04/15/nx-s1-5355896/doge-nlrb-elon-... Oh come on, search-engines have gone downhill, but not that far downhill! You already know it involves "DOGE" and "Russia" and "credentials", that ought to be enough: > Berulis alleged in the affidavit that there attempted logins to NLRB systems from an IP address in Russia in the days after DOGE accessed the systems. He told Reuters Tuesday that the attempted logins apparently included correct username and password combinations but were rejected by location-related conditional access policies. * https://www.reuters.com/technology/cybersecurity/whistleblow... * https://www.npr.org/2025/04/15/nx-s1-5355896/doge-nlrb-elon-...
btown - 3 days ago
mzajc - 3 days ago
nucleardog - 3 days ago
mcv - 2 days ago
KaiserPro - 2 days ago
sandworm101 - 2 days ago
nucleardog - 2 days ago
Spooky23 - 2 days ago
lakeviewterrace - 3 days ago
hackernud3s - 3 days ago
Terr_ - 3 days ago
FireBeyond - 3 days ago
trismus - 3 days ago
adzm - 3 days ago
Terr_ - 3 days ago